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Abstract  
Optimal currency area (OCA) theory has been influential in pushing eurozone 
countries towards structural reforms to make product and labour markets more 
flexible. The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is 
that asymmetric shocks are permanent. However, when shocks are temporary it does 
not follow that more flexibility is the answer. When shocks are the result of business-
cycle movements, the way to deal with them is by stabilisation efforts. This paper 
provides empirical evidence that suggests that the biggest shocks in the eurozone were 
the result of business-cycle movements. These were relatively well synchronised, 
except for their amplitude. We argue that efforts to stabilise business cycles should be 
strengthened relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms, 
with consideration given to the implications for the governance of the eurozone. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, substantial efforts have been 
made to create a new form of governance for the eurozone that will make the monetary 
union more robust in absorbing future economic and financial shocks. Much of the drive to 
adapt the governance of the eurozone has been influenced by the traditional theory of the 
optimal currency area (OCA), which stresses the need for flexibility in product and labour 
markets. As a result, the eurozone countries have been pushed towards structural reforms 
that aim to reduce the structural rigidities in product and labour markets, in the hope that 
this would lead to a more resilient monetary union capable of withstanding future 
asymmetric shocks.  
Figure 1, which presents the OECD product market legislation index, shows that the 
eurozone countries have introduced structural reforms at a faster pace than the rest of the 
OECD countries. Figure 2, which presents the OECD index of employment protection, shows 
how the eurozone has significantly reduced its tight employment protection, especially since 
the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. It is interesting to note that since the early 1990s the non-
eurozone OECD countries have followed a reverse trend of increasing employment 
protection.  
In this paper we ask whether this movement towards structural reform as part of the push 
for new governance is really going in the right direction. We will argue that this is not the 
case. The main reason is that the nature of the shocks that have hit the eurozone does not 
correspond to the pattern of asymmetric shocks that has been identified by the OCA theory 
to require more flexibility. We will argue that what is needed in the eurozone is not more 
structural reforms but a better mechanism capable of dealing with the classical boom and 
bust dynamics that are inherent to capitalism. 
Hyman Minsky’s (1986) classic analysis of booms and busts in capitalist systems stresses the 
need to stabilise government mechanisms. We will ask whether the eurozone, which has 
moved towards more flexibility, provides for this stabilising mechanism.  
In sections 2 and 3, we analyse what the OCA theory has to say about the need for flexibility 
and stabilisation in the face of asymmetric shocks. In section 4 we analyse empirically the 
nature of these shocks in the eurozone and in section 5 we study what this evidence might 
means for the governance of the eurozone.   
                                                   
* Paul De Grauwe is Professor of international economics, London School of Economics and Yuemei Ji 
is Lecturer, University College London. The authors are grateful for the financial support provided by 
the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 Firstrun Project. They also gratefully acknowledge the 
comments and suggestions from Daniel Gros, Frank Vandenbroucke and anonymous referees. 
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Figure 1. Product market legislation index 
 
Source: OECD. 
Figure 2. Employment protection legislation index 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
2. Standard OCA theory and the governance of the eurozone 
OCA theory has created a set of ideas that has a significant influence on the governance of 
the eurozone and on views about how this governance should be strengthened in the future. 
The best way to make this clear is to present the core of the OCA theory, using a well-known 
graphical representation of this theory (see De Grauwe, 2014)). This is done in Figure 3.  On 
the horizontal axis we set out the degree of flexibility in the labour and goods markets. This 
measures the degree to which wages and prices adjust freely to shocks and the degree to 
which workers are mobile. We assume that these different dimensions of flexibility can be 
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represented by one index. On the vertical axis we set out the degree of symmetry between 
countries, i.e. the degree of co-movement (correlation) of macroeconomic variables such as 
output and employment. Thus, when there are a lot of asymmetric shocks we move 
downwards along the vertical axis. By contrast, when shocks become less asymmetric we 
move upwards along the vertical axis.  
The downward sloping OCA line represents the trade-off between symmetry and flexibility. 
Hence, when the degree of symmetry declines (there are more asymmetric shocks) countries 
in a monetary union need more flexibility to deal with these shocks. The OCA-line separates 
the space into two zones. The OCA-zone above the OCA-line contains the collection of points 
at which symmetry and flexibility are high enough to guarantee that the benefits of the 
monetary union exceed the costs. The points below the OCA-line are the points at which 
symmetry and flexibility are too low, i.e. countries located in that zone will find that the costs 
of the monetary union exceed the benefits. The OCA-line that separates the two zones can 
therefore also be defined as the collection of points for which the benefits and the costs of the 
monetary union are equal.  
Figure 3. OCA theory trade-off between symmetry and flexibility                       
This theory has been very influential for the governance of the eurozone and continues to be 
so. It is at the core of the policy prescriptions that call for structural reforms so as to make the 
labour and goods markets more flexible. In fact, since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 
2010 member countries have been pressured by the European Commission to introduce a 
whole set of structural reforms. The member countries that turned to the eurozone for 
financial support (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) were given this support conditional on 
introducing a series of structural reforms that would make labour and goods markets more 
Symmetry 
Flexibility 
OCA 
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flexible. The underlying rationale was the OCA theory that stresses the need for flexibility to 
deal with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. 
One of the underlying assumptions of this theory and its prescription for flexibility is that 
the asymmetric shocks are permanent. When shocks are permanent, e.g. a change in 
preferences that leads consumers in one country to buy more of the foreign than of the 
domestic good, or a productivity increase in one but not in another country, then there is 
really no other way in a monetary union to deal with such a shock other than changing 
relative prices (wages or product prices) or by a movement of labour and capital.  
Things are very different, however, when shocks are temporary. In that case, it can be argued 
that flexibility is not necessary. In fact it can even be harmful. Take the case of business cycle 
movements. When these are asymmetric, i.e. when they are not synchronised, it makes little 
sense to adjust by relative price changes and/or by movements of labour and capital. 
Flexibility may in fact exacerbate the business cycle movements and its asymmetry. For 
example, if country A experiences a recession and country B a boom the movement of labour 
from A to B is likely to exacerbate the recession in country A and the boom in country B.  Or 
take flexibility of wages. If during the recession country A is forced to reduce wages, the 
immediate effect of the wage cuts will be a decline in aggregate demand, which will make 
the recession in country A more severe. 
From the preceding analysis it follows that temporary shocks, such as business cycle 
movements, should be dealt with differently, i.e. by stabilisation efforts that smooth 
consumption over time.   
However, the OCA theory that focuses on the trade-off between flexibility and symmetry 
was developed on the assumption that asymmetric shocks are permanent. These shocks are 
also typically exogenous, like meteor impacts. There is nothing one can do about these. One 
is forced to adjust by making the system more flexible.  
Business cycle shocks, by contrast, can be said to be endogenous. They are the result of 
endogenous movements in optimism and pessimism that lead to booms and busts. These 
movements have been endemic in capitalism and will continue to do their work also in a 
monetary union. They have been described by Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger (2001). To 
the extent that these movements are not synchronised, they do not call for more flexibility; 
rather they call for insurance mechanisms that allow countries experiencing a downturn to 
be compensated by countries that experience a boom, in such a way that when the fortunes 
of countries are reversed the transfers are reversed.  
It has long been recognised that such an insurance mechanism requires some form of 
budgetary union. Thus, endogenous and asymmetric business cycle movements call for very 
different institutions in the union from the permanent and exogenous shocks that have been 
at the core of the OCA analysis.  
3. Governance of a monetary union in the face of temporary shocks 
In this section we consider what the nature of the institutions of a monetary union should be 
when the shocks are endogenous, temporary and asymmetric. We will focus on business 
cycle movements that are driven by ‘animal spirits’, i.e. movements of optimism and 
pessimism that lead to booms during periods of optimism and recessions during periods of 
pessimism. In this section we focus on the theory. In the next section we analyse the 
empirical question of the nature of the asymmetric shocks in the eurozone.  
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We start from a similar trade-off to the one in Figure 3, but now we concentrate on the trade-
off between flexibility and budgetary union. A budgetary union should be seen as an 
insurance mechanism that allows countries experiencing bad economic times to be 
compensated by countries that fare well.  
The way this trade-off is constructed is as follows (Figure 4). On the vertical axis we set out 
the degree of budgetary union. The higher the degree of budgetary union the more we move 
upwards along the vertical line. On the horizontal axis we set out the same measure of 
flexibility as that used in figure 3. The OCAS line now measures the minimum combinations 
of budgetary union and flexibility needed to make a monetary union economically attractive 
(higher benefits than costs).  It is negatively sloped for the following reason. When budgetary 
union increases, insurance against asymmetric shocks increases, making monetary union less 
costly. As a result, there is less need for flexibility. We move upward along the negatively 
sloped OCAS line.1 
This is an important insight. Flexibility may sound great for many economists and central 
bankers, but it is costly for those people who are forced to be flexible. Flexibility means that 
these people may have to accept a wage cut or be forced to emigrate. We learn from Figure 4 
that a movement towards budgetary union alleviates the (painful) need to be flexible. It may 
also make a monetary union more acceptable to large segments of the population. 
Figure 4. Trade-off between budgetary union and flexibility                        
We can use the insights of Figure 4 to analyse the importance of the 
                                                   
1 We call this trade-off the OCAs line because the idea of such a trade-off comes from André Sapir 
(2015). 
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nature of the asymmetric shocks. We have made the distinction between asymmetric shocks 
that are exogenous and permanent, and asymmetric shocks that are temporary and 
endogenous. We have argued that when a permanent (exogenous) shock occurs flexibility is 
the only option to adjust to this shock. By contrast, when business cycle movements are 
desynchronised it is not optimal to use flexibility. In that case an insurance mechanism is the 
appropriate way to govern the monetary union. A budgetary union provides this.  
It can now be shown that the nature of the shocks influences the slope of the trade-off.2 When 
the shocks are mainly of the permanent type, we obtain a steep trade-off. We show this in 
Figure 5. We have also put the eurozone of 19 members below the OCAS-line, suggesting that 
the present eurozone is not an optimal currency area. The steep trade-off implies that a small 
increase in flexibility leads us quicker into the OCA zone than a budgetary union. In the 
most extreme case, i.e. when all shocks are of a permanent nature, the trade-off becomes 
vertical. In that case no amount of budgetary union will bring us into the OCA-zone. There is 
then no other way but to increase flexibility.  
Figure 5. How to move the eurozone towards the OCAs’ area when permanent shocks dominate?                        
Things are very different when the shocks are temporary, driven by business cycle 
movements. In that case the tradeoff is flat (Figure 6). As a result, much flexibility is needed 
to move the eurozone into the OCA area compared to budgetary union. A relatively small 
increase in budgetary union will bring us into the OCA-zone. In the most extreme case, i.e. 
                                                   
2 We are grateful to Frank Vandenbroucke for suggesting that the nature of the shocks affects the slope 
of the trade-off.  
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when all shocks are of a temporary nature,, the trade-off is horizontal. In that case no amount 
of flexibility will succeed in bringing the eurozone into the OCA-zone. The only way to 
achieve optimality will be through a budgetary union.  
Figure 6. How to move the eurozone towards the OCAs’ area when business cycle movements 
dominate? 
                      
One complication that arises here has to do with hysteresis. Sometimes temporary shocks 
can lead to hysteresis effects. For example, a recession typically leads to plant closures and 
dismissal of workers. To the extent that these workers have developed firm specific skills 
that are lost when the firm disappears, the workers lose part of their human capital making it 
difficult to find another (comparable) job. Unemployment can then become protracted. 
Another example relates to the nature of the boom. If, as was the case in Ireland and Spain, 
the boom is concentrated in the housing market, many workers are attracted to this sector 
during the boom. After the crash they are dismissed. They may find it difficult to use their 
skills acquired in the housing market in other sectors of the economy. There is a large 
literature on sources of hysteresis (see Blanchard et al., 1986, Ball, 2009 and Fatas & 
Summers, 2015). 
The existence of hysteresis has implications for our discussion. It implies that if a business 
cycle shock occurs it matters a great deal to try to use stabilization so as to avoid hysteresis 
effects.  If temporary business cycle shocks have permanent effects the need to set up 
schemes that will mitigate the impact of these shocks becomes even more important.  
Budgetary union 
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Eurozone 
8  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Figures 5 and 6 lead to another interesting insight. Flexibility in labour markets is something 
national governments can do. There is no need for further integration to increase flexibility. 
Budgetary union, however, is of a different nature. It requires political integration. In other 
words, while flexibility is in the realm of national governments, budgetary union is a 
European affair (Sapir, 2015). Thus, when shocks are permanent they have to be dealt with at 
the national level while when shocks are temporary the response should be at the level of the 
eurozone.   
4. The nature of shocks in the eurozone: empirical evidence 
It is not always easy to separate permanent from temporary shocks in economic time series. 
Here we use a Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) that allows us to estimate the long-term trend 
component in GDP. The cyclical component is obtained by subtracting the trend component 
from the observed GDP3 (for more detail, see appendix, where we also analyse the 
robustness of the results for changes in the smoothness parameter lambda in the HP filter).  
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 7. We present, for each eurozone country,4 
trend growth and the observed growth rates (the cyclical component is obtained by 
subtracting the observed from the trend growth).  Two results stand out. First, we observe 
for all eurozone countries (except for Germany) a decline in the long-term growth rate of 
GDP. This decline is particularly significant in Greece, Ireland, Finland, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy. Second, there is great variability in the business cycle (temporary) component of GDP 
growth. In order to gauge the relative importance of cyclical and trend components in GDP 
growth we compare the mean (absolute)5 cyclical growth of GDP with the (absolute) mean 
trend growth of GDP for each country. We show the results in Table 1. We observe that for 
the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands) the cyclical growth and 
trend growth components are of similar magnitudes, although the cyclical component is 
systematically larger than the trend component. In the countries of the periphery (Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Greece) this is very different. We observe that for these countries 
the cyclical growth component is much larger than the trend growth component (the most 
extreme case being observed for Greece). Thus, in the peripheral countries the GDP growth 
rates have been dominated by cyclical movements in economic activity of the boom-bust 
type.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Cyclical and trend components in GDP growth (1999-2014) 
 
                                                   
3 There is a literature based on Blanchard & Quah (1989) that is based on estimating a VAR and, after 
imposing identifying restrictions, is able to estimate the temporary and the permanent component in 
output shocks. We discuss this literature in section 5. 
4 We only include the original eurozone countries. The new eurozone countries entered too late to 
provide a sufficiently long time series.  
5 As the cyclical component alternates between positive and negative numbers we have to take the 
absolute values.   
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Sources: Eurostat and own calculations.    
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Table 1. Mean (absolute) trend growth and mean (absolute) business cycle change in GDP 
(in percent) during 1999-2014 
  Mean cycle Mean trend ratio 
Austria 1,79% 1,77% 1,01 
Belgium 1,72% 1,67% 1,03 
Germany 1,55% 1,23% 1,26 
France 2,15% 1,49% 1,44 
Netherlands  2,66% 1,66% 1,60 
Finland 4,35% 2,02% 2,15 
Spain 4,58% 2,07% 2,21 
Ireland 8,01% 3,35% 2,39 
Portugal 3,67% 0,81% 4,53 
Italy 2,86% 0,41% 7,05 
Greece 9,09% 0,90% 10,11 
Source: Computations based on data from Eurostat. 
What are the implications of these results? First, since the start of the eurozone, cyclical 
(temporary) movements have been the dominant factor behind growth variations in GDP. 
This is especially the case in those peripheral countries where cyclical movements in 
economic growth are many times higher than the long-term growth rates. Thus, as 
mentioned earlier, booms and bust in economic activity seems to be the overwhelming 
characteristic of movements in GDP in the countries of the periphery.  
Second, it appears that the cyclical movements of GDP are highly correlated in the eurozone. 
This is made clear by Table 2, which shows the correlations in the cyclical components of 
GDP growth across the eurozone. We observe high correlation coefficients of bilateral 
cyclical components of GDP growth, typically 0.8 or more. It is interesting to note that the 
country with the lowest correlation coefficients is Germany (although the German 
correlation coefficients are all positive). Thus, one can conclude that the business cycles of 
the eurozone countries were highly correlated. Germany stands out as the country with the 
lowest (positive) correlations of its business cycle with the rest of the eurozone.   
Table 2. Correlation coefficients of cyclical components of GDP growth 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherl Port 
Austria   
Belgium 0,97   
Finland 0,97 0,98   
France 0,93 0,95 0,97   
Germany 0,69 0,57 0,55 0,59   
Greece 0,73 0,82 0,84 0,74 0,09   
Ireland 0,85 0,89 0,92 0,95 0,41 0,81   
Italy 0,91 0,96 0,98 0,96 0,50 0,86 0,93   
Netherlands 0,93 0,94 0,93 0,91 0,60 0,75 0,86 0,90   
Portugal 0,98 0,89 0,89 0,87 0,37 0,82 0,87 0,90 0,94   
Spain 0,85 0,91 0,94 0,87 0,27 0,97 0,90 0,95 0,86 0,90 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
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Thus, the asymmetry between the eurozone countries is to be found not so much in a lack of 
correlation in business cycle movements but in the intensity of the boom-bust dynamics of 
growth rates. Put differently, eurozone countries’ business cycles seem to have been 
relatively well correlated. The difference between these countries was that some (mainly in 
the periphery) experienced much higher variance in business-cycle fluctuations than others 
(in the core). As a result, the asymmetry between member countries is to be found in the 
variance of the business cycles. This feature is striking in Figure 8, which shows the 
movements of the business-cycle components in the different eurozone countries. These 
appear to move together but are of very different amplitude. Some countries like Ireland and 
Spain experience a very strong boom and later bust, while countries like Belgium, Austria 
and Germany experience similar cycles but of much less amplitude.  
In order to obtain a more precise estimate of the asymmetry in the amplitudes of the business 
cycles, we regressed each country’s domestic cyclical component on the eurozone common 
cyclical component. The estimated slope coefficients reveal the extent to which the domestic 
cycles are smaller or lower in amplitude than the common cycle. The estimated slope 
coefficients are presented in Table 3. It is striking to find how different these slope 
coefficients are. Germany, Belgium, Austria and France have slope coefficients that are 
significantly lower than 1, suggesting cycles of significantly lower amplitude than the euro-
cycle. Conversely, Finland, Spain, and especially Ireland and Greece, have slope coefficients 
significantly higher than 1.  This suggests that these countries experienced much higher 
amplitudes in their business cycles than the common euro-cycle.  
Figure 8. Business cycle component of GDP growth 
 
Data source: Own calculation based on Eurostat.  
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Table 3. Slope of regression domestic cycle on euro-cycle 
  slope 
Germany 0,21 
Belgium 0,48 
Austria 0,49 
France 0,55 
Italy  0,77 
Netherlands 0,80 
Portugal 1,02 
Finland 1,21 
Spain 1,22 
Ireland 2,07 
Greece 2,18 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 9 shows another aspect of this asymmetry. We present the standard deviations (across 
countries) of the cyclical components of GDP growth and observe a striking pattern. During 
the boom years 1999-2007 the standard deviation increases significantly. At the start of the 
financial crisis in 2008 the standard deviations decline but pick up again in 2011. This 
evidence suggests that during the boom years between 1999 and 2007 the asymmetry in the 
amplitude of the business cycle increased significantly until the crash, when it declined 
dramatically. In other words, the crash was almost as intensive again. Things changed with 
the sovereign debt crisis, which had the effect of introducing an increasing divergence in the 
amplitude of the cycle. This result is also confirmed by Allard, et al. (2013), who find that 
growth divergence has continued to be high and in fact increased during the second half of 
the 2000s. 
Figure 9. Standard deviation cyclical component 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat. 
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5. Comparison with other empirical results 
How do our results compare with other empirical studies analysing the nature of 
asymmetric shocks in the eurozone? The empirical research on asymmetric shocks has been 
very much influenced by Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1993). These authors applied the 
Blanchard & Quah (1989) procedure that extracts demand and supply shocks from structural 
VARs. This procedure is applied to every eurozone country. These national demand and 
supply shocks are then correlated with the other countries’ demand and supply shocks, or 
with an estimate of the eurozone-wide demand and supply shocks.  The latter procedure 
was applied by Fidrmuc & Korhonen (2002). We show their results in Table 3.  It is striking 
to find how low the correlation coefficients are. In fact they are so low that most are not 
significantly different from zero.   
Table 4. Correlation of demand shocks 
Austria 0,08 
Belgium 0 
Finland 0,06 
France 0,3 
Germany 0,18 
Greece -0,01 
Ireland 0,13 
Italy 0,57 
Netherlands 0,04 
Portugal  0,09 
Spain 0,16 
Source: Fidrmuc & Korhonen (2002). 
Such a result should not really be surprising. In the Blanchard & Quah (1989) procedure a 
structural VAR is used on macroeconomic variables such as output and prices. This means 
that in the first step all endogenous relations between these variables is taken out. What is 
left over is the exogenous noise (the exogenous chocks) in these variables. By introducing 
identifying restrictions this procedure then finally allows us to interpret part of this 
exogenous noise to come from aggregate demand and part from aggregate supply. This 
exogenous noise appears to be rather small compared to the movements generated by the 
endogenous dynamics of booms and busts. It is therefore not really surprising that this 
procedure leads to low and mostly insignificant correlations across countries.  
The Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1993) approach (which is based on the Blanchard & Quah 
(1989) procedure is very much influenced by the standard OCA literature. As argued earlier, 
the latter has focused on exogenous shocks and how these are correlated across countries. It 
is clear that by eliminating the endogenous boom and bust cycles from the statistical analysis 
one obtains a very shallow view on the nature of the asymmetry of shocks in the eurozone. 
Our procedure does not have this drawback and allows us to obtain a better view on how 
intensely the eurozone business cycles are connected.  
To conclude this and the previous section we would like to stress two limitations of our 
empirical analysis. First, our analysis has been based on the first 15 years of the eurozone. 
This period saw massive boom-bust dynamics. The boom in a number of peripheral 
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countries can be said to have been influenced by the start of the eurozone, which led to 
strong declines in the real interest rates in these countries. Surely, the future will look 
different. Yet, as capitalism has been a story of booms and busts, one should expect that 
these dynamics will come back, albeit triggered by other events.  
Second, the fact that we find overwhelming evidence for the existence of temporary business 
cycle movements does not make the classical OCA shocks irrelevant. These will also occur 
regularly. The case of Finland illustrates this. This country recently experienced a classical 
OCA shock, necessitating an internal devaluation. When these shocks occur there will be a 
need for flexibility.  
6. Implications for the governance of the eurozone 
The findings reported in the previous sections put the need for stabilisation in the eurozone 
in a new light. We analyse two implications that involve steps towards fiscal integration.  
First, the finding of the overwhelming importance of the cyclical and temporary component 
of output growth should lead to the conclusion that efforts to stabilise the business cycle 
should be strengthened relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural 
reforms. In terms of our theoretical analysis this means that Figure 6 is probably the relevant 
one. Again, this does not mean that flexibility can be disposed of.  
6.1 Common unemployment insurance 
A second implication of our empirical results relates to the many proposals made to create a 
fiscal space at the eurozone level in the form of a common unemployment insurance system 
(see e.g. Van Rompuy et al., 2012, the so-called “Four Presidents report”, Enderlein et al., 
2012 and Beblavy et al., 2015). The proposals for such an insurance system have very much 
been influenced by the standard assumption made in the OCA-theory that shocks are 
asymmetric, i.e. that when one country experiences a recession, and thus increasing 
unemployment, the other country experiences a boom, and declining unemployment. This 
facilitates the workings of the common unemployment insurance system. The booming 
country transfers resources to the country in a recession and thereby smoothes the business 
cycles in the two countries. Technically and politically such a system encounters relatively 
few problems.  
Problems may arise when, as we have found, business cycles are relatively well 
synchronised but of very different amplitude in the different member countries. In that case 
most countries will tend to experience a recession at about the same time; in some countries 
the recession will be mild but in others very intense. This creates both an economic and a 
political problem. First, countries with a mild recession are asked to transfer resources to 
countries experiencing a stronger recession. This tends to reduce the intensity of the 
recession in the latter country at the expense of making it more intense in the former country. 
It is not clear that this improves welfare. Second, it is likely to create important political 
problems in the former country that is asked to transfer resources when the economy is not 
doing well.  
Another way to formulate the previous insights is the following. The traditional proposals 
for a eurozone unemployment insurance mechanism are predicated on the view that there is 
a need to smooth differences in unemployment changes across countries. That is, it is 
assumed that some countries experience increases others declines in unemployment. The 
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insurance mechanism then smoothes these inter-country differences. We have noted, 
however, that this is not a typical eurozone asymmetry. What we found is that most 
countries are likely to experience a boom and a recession at about the same time, with 
different intensities and amplitudes. There is therefore relatively little need for inter-country 
smoothing of business cycle movements. The more pressing need is to smooth volatilities 
over time.  
The previous analysis suggests that common unemployment insurance schemes should put 
emphasis on smoothing over time and not so much on inter-country smoothing. This can be 
achieved by allowing the common unemployment insurance scheme to accumulate deficits 
and surpluses over time. The fiscal rule that could be imposed is that the insurance scheme 
balances over the business cycle. Beblavy & Maselli (2014) have performed interesting 
simulations of several schemes that impose such a fiscal rule. In general it appears from these 
simulations that such an insurance mechanism can be implemented. Such a rule would make 
it possible to automatically balance the need for inter-country and inter-temporal smoothing. 
6.2 National stabilisation? 
In principle, inter-temporal smoothing could be done at the national level, by allowing the 
national budgets to do the job. However, the large differences in the amplitude of business-
cycle movements makes such a purely national approach problematic, as it leads to large 
differences in the budget deficits and debt accumulation between countries. These 
differences quickly spill over into financial markets when countries that are hit very hard by 
a downward movement in output are subjected to sudden stops and liquidity crises (see De 
Grauwe, 2011). This is likely to force them to switch off the automatic stabilisers in their 
national budgets (De Grauwe & Ji, 2012). As we argued, there this can push countries into a 
bad equilibrium.  
Put differently, in the absence of a budgetary union, large differences in the amplitude of the 
business cycles are likely to hit the countries experiencing the more severe recession by 
“sudden stops”, i.e. by large liquidity outflows that force them to abandon any ambition to 
stabilise the business cycle shocks. In addition, these liquidity outflows are inflows in some 
other countries in the monetary union, typically those that are least hit by the recession.6 
Their economic conditions improve at the expense of the others. The stabilisation of common 
business shocks with different amplitudes at the national level makes the system unstable.  
In this respect the research of Alcidi & Thirion (2015) is relevant. These authors find that 
while the core eurozone countries have been able to stabilise part (about 50%) of the 
business-cycle shocks at the national level since the eruption of the debt crisis in 2010, the 
peripheral countries have been unable to do so, and also unable to profit from insurance 
mechanisms at the level of the eurozone. As a result, most (90%) of the business-cycle shocks 
had to be absorbed by drops in consumption (and therefore in employment).  
National stabilisation efforts do not work but introduce an element of instability into a 
monetary union, mainly because they leave the countries most hit by the business-cycle 
shocks unable to stabilise. Thus, when business-cycle shocks dominate (as we have shown in 
the previous section) it will be necessary to follow a common approach to the stabilisation of 
the business cycles. This can only be provided by a budgetary union. By centralising part of 
                                                   
6 This is confirmed by the empirical work of Furceri & Zdzienicka (2013) and Hoffmann & Nitschka 
(2012) who find that during recessions risk sharing through financial markets declines dramatically. 
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the national budgets into a common budget managed by a common political authority, the 
different increases in budget deficits following from a (common) recession translate into a 
budget deficit at the union level. As a result, the destabilising flows of liquidity between 
countries disappear, and the common budgetary authority can allow the automatic 
stabilisers in the budget to do their role in smoothing the business cycle. In fact, because a 
common budget also generates implicit inter-country transfers the countries with the deepest 
recession will profit from the automatic stabilising features of the common budget most. As a 
result, a common budget provided the most effective way to stabilise the business cycle.   
It is clear, however, that a budgetary union in which a significant part of national taxation 
and spending is transferred to a European government and parliament is far off. It cannot, 
therefore, be invoked today to solve the lack of stabilisation at the European level.  
In addition, the common insurance mechanisms now being proposed (see Beblavy & Maselli, 
2014) have a relatively small inter-temporal smoothing component, amounting to no more 
than 0.1% to 0.2% of GDP over the business cycle, certainly insufficient to produce a 
significant inter-temporal smoothing at the EU-level. Fortunately, there are possibilities to 
enhance stabilisation at the eurozone level that do not require a full budgetary union. 
6.3 A stabilisation fund 
Here is a scheme that can provide some stabilisation at the eurozone level. A stabilisation 
fund would be set up. This could in fact be the existing European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). During recessions, the ESM would buy national government bonds and issue an 
equivalent amount of ESM-bonds (Eurobonds) backed by the participating member-
countries.  During booms the EMS would do the opposite, i.e. buy back the ESM-bonds and 
sell the national bonds into the bond markets. In doing so, there would be no net 
accumulation of ESM-bonds over the business cycle.  
How does this scheme contribute to stabilisation at the eurozone level? During recessions 
national budget deficits increase automatically. Put differently, national governments have 
to issue new government bonds. We have argued that this process is likely to lead to 
destabilising capital flows, as some countries’ recessions are deeper than others. This leads to 
more bond issues in the countries hit by the deepest recessions than in the countries 
experiencing mild recessions. The bond-buying operations by the ESM would then tend to 
support the government bond markets in the eurozone in general, but at the same time the 
support would be strongest in the government bond markets of the countries experiencing 
the deepest recessions. As a result, the EMS-buying operations would tend to unify the 
government bond markets and would reduce the scope for destabilising capital flows within 
the eurozone. This would be a significant achievement.7 
There are many technical issues to be solved here. In particular, in order to avoid a net 
accumulation of EMS-bonds over the business cycle, the EMS would only be allowed to buy 
bonds corresponding to the cyclical component of the government budget. This makes the 
computation of reliable structural government balances imperative.  
                                                   
7 The proposed stabilisation fund resembles the proposal made by Drèze & Durré (2012). Their 
proposal, however, is a pure inter-country insurance mechanism insisting that the fund balance its 
books at each moment in time. Note also that the scheme proposed here is very different from the 
OMT-programme of the ECB that is intended to be used in times of crisis. In addition, OMT is 
conditional on austerity programmes and tends to be procyclical. 
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7. EMU and long-term growth 
We argued that there are too few institutions in the eurozone to perform the necessary 
stabilisation responsibilities of a monetary union. It is clear from our previous analysis that 
there is also a long-term growth problem in the eurozone. This is made obvious in Table 5. 
This shows the estimated long-term growth rates in 1995 and in 2014 in the eurozone 
countries. These are obtained from the same Hodrick-Prescott procedure used in the 
previous sections. We observe that there has been a significant decline of the trend growth in 
all countries. Note that this has been observed in most developed countries (see Summers, 
2014 and Teugels & Baldwin, 2014). 
Conventional policy-maker wisdom in the EU is that the low and declining long-term 
growth in the eurozone is due to a lack of flexibility in product and labour markets. As a 
result of this wisdom, countries have been pushed towards introducing structural reform 
programmes. We showed the evidence in Figures 1 and 2. Yet all the enthusiasm for 
introducing flexibility in product and labour markets has borne little fruit in terms of 
boosting economic growth in the eurozone. In fact, declining long-term economic growth has 
been correlated with increasing flexibility. In Appendix II we present an econometric 
analysis of the relation between long-term economic growth and flexibility of labour and 
product markets. We conclude from that analysis that the evidence of a positive correlation 
between growth and flexibility is weak (see also IMF, 2015). 
Table 5. Estimates of long-term growth rates in eurozone in 1995 and 2014 
  Trend 1995 
Trend 
2014 Change 
Austria 2,05% 1,62% -0,42% 
Belgium 1,95% 1,52% -0,43% 
Finland 2,76% 1,64% -1,12% 
France 1,84% 1,32% -0,52% 
Germany 1,31% 1,20% -0,12% 
Greece 2,19% 0,10% -2,09% 
Ireland 4,74% 2,71% -2,03% 
Italy 0,87% 0,15% -0,72% 
Netherlands 2,17% 1,42% -0,75% 
Portugal 1,50% 0,47% -1,03% 
Spain 2,81% 1,65% -1,15% 
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat. 
8. Conclusion 
Since the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, member countries have been pushed towards 
introducing more flexibility into labour and product markets. This drive towards structural 
reforms was very much influenced by the traditional theory of optimal currency areas. This 
theory stresses that in the face of asymmetric shocks member countries should have a 
sufficient degree of labour and product market flexibility to adjust to these shocks. Without 
such flexibility adjustment will be impossible, thereby undermining the sustainability of the 
monetary union.  
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The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for structural reform is that asymmetric 
shocks are permanent (e.g. permanent changes in preferences or productivity shocks). When 
the shocks are temporary it does not follow that more flexibility is the answer. More 
specifically, when the shocks are the result of unsynchronised business cycle movements, the 
way to deal with them is by stabilisation efforts.  
In this paper we have provided empirical evidence to suggest that the most significant 
shocks in the eurozone have been the result of boom and bust, driven by waves of optimism 
and pessimism. These business-cycle movements have been relatively well-synchronised. 
What was not synchronised was the amplitude of these business-cycle movements, where 
some countries experienced much greater amplitude in business cycles than others. 
In principle, these business-cycle movements could be stabilised at the national level without 
the need for budgetary union. However, as the amplitude of these movements is so different, 
countries experiencing the deepest recession are likely to be hit by ‘sudden stops’, i.e. 
liquidity outflows triggered by fear and panic, which forces them to switch off the automatic 
stabilisers in the budget, preventing them from conducting any stabilisation.  
We argued that the best possible way to deal with the business-cycle movements whose 
amplitude is unsynchronised is by introducing a budgetary union. By centralising part of the 
national budgets into a common budget managed by a common political authority, the 
various increases in budget deficits following from a (common) recession translate into a 
budget deficit at the union level. As a result, the destabilising flows of liquidity between 
countries during the recession disappear, and the common budgetary authority can allow 
the automatic stabiliser in the common budget to perform its role in smoothing the business 
cycle. 
It is highly unlikely that the governance of the eurozone will move in the direction of 
creating institutions capable of providing the necessary stabilisation of booms and busts that 
national governments are no longer able to provide. The willingness to move in this 
direction is minimal. Thus, one has to look for schemes that introduce some stabilisation at 
the eurozone level without going all the way towards budgetary union. 
We discussed two schemes that have a potential for stabilisation at the eurozone level. One is 
a common unemployment insurance scheme that puts more emphasis on inter-temporal 
insurance and less on inter-country insurance. The second scheme consists of using the ESM 
as a stabiliser of national government bond markets. It would buy national government 
bonds and issue ESM bonds during recession and do the opposite during an economic boom, 
making sure that over the business cycle there would be no net issue of ESM bonds. We 
argued that this would make it possible to stabilise the government bond markets during a 
recession, thereby avoiding a destabilisation of capital flows within the eurozone.  
We also argued that the new governance of the eurozone that is based on imposing 
structural reforms does not solve the stabilisation problem that arises from the fact that most 
asymmetric shocks in the eurozone originate in booms and busts in economic activity.  
This new governance focus on structural reforms is also unlikely to boost long-term growth. 
As we have shown in this paper, structural reforms have a negligible effect on long-term 
growth. The paradox is that the austerity programmes followed in the eurozone have 
reduced public investment dramatically and have thereby eliminated one of the most 
important channels to long-term economic growth. 
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Appendix 1. Comparing GDP growth estimates using a high and low lamda 
As suggested in the main text, the choice of the smoothing parameter (lamda) in the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter has a significant influence on the estimate of the cyclical and 
permanent components of GDP-growth. In this appendix we illustrate this by comparing 
estimates, using a high and a low lamda. The high lamda is the same as the one used in the 
text and was set equal to 1200; the low lamda was set equal to 100. We compare the results in 
Figure A1. It is immediately evident that in the low lamda estimates the long-term growth 
line follows the observed output growth line more closely. As a result, the cyclical 
component is on average smaller than in the high lamda case. This is made clear in Table A1, 
which shows the mean absolute changes in the trend and cyclical components. Even in the 
case of a low lamda we find that the peripheral countries have been subjected to larger 
cyclical than permanent movements in output.  
Table A2 presents the correlation coefficients of the cyclical components of GDP growth for 
low lamda. It should be compared with Table 2 in the text. We observe that in the low lamda 
estimates the correlation coefficients are of a similar order of magnitude as in the high lamda 
case. Thus, one of our main conclusions, i.e. that business cycles have been highly correlated, 
is maintained. This is also made clear in Figure A2 that shows the evolution of the business 
cycle component in the two estimates. Obviously, in the low lamda estimate the business 
cycle components are generally lower than in the high lamda estimate. In both cases, though, 
we observe similarly correlated booms and busts in the eurozone. And, as Figure A3 
indicates, the divergence in the amplitude of the business cycles across countries tends to 
increase during the boom years prior to the crisis. This is also what we found using estimates 
with a high lamda. Thus, one of our major empirical conclusions still stands, even when one 
uses a low lamda. This is that the asymmetry in the business cycles of the eurozone countries 
is to be found in the divergence in the amplitude of the business cycle. The business cycles 
themselves tended to be highly correlated.   
There is reason to believe that the low lamda estimates bias the business cycle components 
downwards and thus the long-term growth component upwards (in absolute value). This is 
made clear from Table A3, which compares the estimates of long-term growth in 1995 and 
2014 in the two lamda scenarios. We find that in the low lamda estimates the decline in long-
term growth in a number of periphery countries is implausibly high. In the cases of Ireland 
and Greece long-term growth declines by more than 7 percentage points. (The corresponding 
declines in the high lamda case is 2%.)     
FLEXIBILITY VERSUS STABILITY: A DIFFICULT TRADE-OFF IN THE EUROZONE  23 
 
Figure A1. Observed and trend growth of GDP 
 
High lamda      Low Lamda 
 
  
  
24  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
High lamda      Low Lamda 
 
 
 
  
FLEXIBILITY VERSUS STABILITY: A DIFFICULT TRADE-OFF IN THE EUROZONE  25 
 
High lamda      Low Lamda 
 
    
26  DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Table A1. Mean absolute changes in the trend and cyclical components 
Low lamda 
  Mean cycle Mean trend ratio 
Belgium 0,97% 1,47% 0,66 
Austria 1,18% 1,58% 0,75 
Spain 1,69% 2,22% 0,76 
France 1,04% 1,27% 0,82 
Portugal 1,63% 1,40% 1,16 
Netherlands  1,61% 1,33% 1,21 
Germany 1,49% 1,18% 1,27 
Ireland 3,26% 2,48% 1,31 
Finland 2,08% 1,53% 1,36 
Italy 1,37% 0,96% 1,42 
Greece 4,50% 2,85% 1,58 
High lamda 
  Mean cycle Mean trend ratio 
Austria 1,79% 1,77% 1,01 
Belgium 1,72% 1,67% 1,03 
Germany 1,55% 1,23% 1,26 
France 2,15% 1,49% 1,44 
Netherlands  2,66% 1,66% 1,60 
Finland 4,35% 2,02% 2,15 
Spain 4,58% 2,07% 2,21 
Ireland 8,01% 3,35% 2,39 
Portugal 3,67% 0,81% 4,53 
Italy 2,86% 0,41% 7,05 
Greece 9,09% 0,90% 10,11  
Table A2. Correlation coefficients of business components of GDP growth 
Low lamda 
  Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherl Port 
Austria   
Belgium 0,95   
Finland 0,96 0,96   
France 0,91 0,91 0,93   
Germany 0,86 0,77 0,79 0,84   
Greece 0,37 0,48 0,51 0,27 -0,01   
Ireland 0,73 0,75 0,79 0,85 0,59 0,45   
Italy 0,84 0,89 0,94 0,90 0,74 0,53 0,78   
Netherlands 0,88 0,86 0,84 0,79 0,78 0,36 0,64 0,74   
Portugal 0,92 0,71 0,65 0,58 0,51 0,46 0,50 0,65 0,85   
Spain 0,68 0,75 0,79 0,62 0,37 0,90 0,70 0,82 0,64 0,65 
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Figure A2. Business cycle component of GDP growth 
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Figure A3. Standard deviation cyclical component 
Low lamda 
 
Table A3. Estimates of long term growth in 1995 and 2014 
Low lamda 
  Trend 1995 Trend 2014 Change 
Austria 2,58% 1,02% -1,56% 
Belgium 2,49% 0,90% -1,59% 
Finland 4,20% 0,09% -4,11% 
France 2,53% 0,69% -1,84% 
Germany 1,55% 1,11% -0,43% 
Greece 4,12% -3,37% -7,49% 
Ireland 7,66% 0,41% -7,26% 
Italy 1,71% -0,86% -2,57% 
Netherlands 3,27% 0,45% -2,83% 
Portugal 2,98% -0,87% -3,85% 
Spain 3,99% -0,14% -4,13% 
High lamda 
  Trend 1995 Trend 2014 Change 
Austria 2,05% 1,62% -0,42% 
Belgium 1,95% 1,52% -0,43% 
Finland 2,76% 1,64% -1,12% 
France 1,84% 1,32% -0,52% 
Germany 1,31% 1,20% -0,12% 
Greece 2,19% 0,10% -2,09% 
Ireland 4,74% 2,71% -2,03% 
Italy 0,87% 0,15% -0,72% 
Netherlands 2,17% 1,42% -0,75% 
Portugal 1,50% 0,47% -1,03% 
Spain 2,81% 1,65% -1,15% 
0.0%0.5%
1.0%1.5%
2.0%2.5%
3.0%3.5%
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Appendix 2. Econometric analysis of the relation between growth and 
flexibility 
In order to find out how labour and product market flexibility affect economic growth, we 
performed an econometric analysis identifying the variables that can affect economic growth. 
The traditional theory of economic growth has identified a number of fundamental variables 
that drive the economic growth process. These variables are population growth, physical and 
human capital accumulation and technological progress (the residual in Solow’s growth 
model). Recent theoretical contributions have highlighted the importance of institutions as 
deep variables that influence the process of capital accumulation and technological progress 
(productivity growth). Influential contributions are Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).  
There are many institutional features that can influence the economic growth process. The 
econometric literature has put a lot of emphasis on political institutions (nature of 
democracy, transparency of political system, rule of law, etc.) that affect the dynamics of 
physical and human capital accumulation and technological progress, and through this 
channel economic growth. The flexibility of labour and capital markets (or the lack thereof) is 
part of the institutional characteristics of countries that can affect economic growth.  
In this section we present the results of estimating an econometric growth model using 
indicators of the degree of flexibility in labour and product markets (as measured by the 
OECD) as one of the institutions that can facilitate capital accumulation and productivity 
growth. The analysis is based on De Grauwe and Ji (2015).  
The study is limited in that it focuses on flexibility in labour and product markets and not 
the many other institutions that have been identified in the econometric growth literature 
(see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) and Acemoglu (2009)). One institutional feature we 
introduce in the analysis is the quality of public governance. We use the World Bank’s index 
of government effectiveness. Our study is limited in another sense. We restrict our 
econometric analysis to OECD countries. The main reason is that the indices of labour and 
output market flexibility that we are interested in have been constructed by the OECD for 
the OECD-member countries. 
One must also take into account that reverse causality may be at work and bias the results. 
This reverse causality runs as follows. In countries with high growth, there is a high demand 
for labour protection. Workers and their representatives are strong and are pushing for 
legislation to provide strong employment protection. As a result, we will observe that high 
growth is correlated with a lot of employment protection. This is in fact what we find when 
applying an OLS estimator in a model explaining growth by employment protection (see De 
Grauwe and Ji (2015)). 
In order to correct for this reverse causality, we used an instrumental variable method. We 
selected two instruments. One is the lagged index of employment protection (EPL), the other 
is the ideological composition of the government along the scale right to left. This takes the 
view that employment protection is positively correlated with the ideological composition of 
governments, i.e. more leftist governments push for more employment protection. The 
results of this instrumental variable estimation are presented in Table 4.   
We find that investment in physical and human capital has the expected positive and 
significant effects on economic growth. Employment protection and product market 
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regulations do not have a significant effect on economic growth. Note that similar results 
were found recently by IMF (2015). By contrast, the World Bank index of government 
effectiveness has a significantly positive effect on economic growth, while government 
consumption (as a % of GDP) negatively affects economic growth.  
We conclude that the mainstream policy view that flexibility in labour and production is 
important to boost economic growth is not based on strong empirical evidence. The paradox 
is that the austerity programmes followed in the eurozone have reduced public investment 
dramatically and thereby have eliminated one of the most important channels that lead to 
long-term economic growth.  
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Table A4. Estimation of economic growth as a function of variables in first column 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
 Advanced 
economies  
1985-2013 
OECD 
economies 
1998-2013 
OECD 
economies 
1998-2013 
Advanced 
economies 
1998-2013 
Advanced 
economies 
1998-2013 
Second Stage:      
      
Investment GDP ratio 0.111 
(0.091) 
0.270** 
(0.129) 
0.339** 
(0.140) 
0.192** 
(0.095) 
0.257** 
(0.118)  
Tertiary education/total 
population 
1.798*** 
(0.148) 
1.492*** 
(0.160) 
1.464*** 
(0.138) 
1.456*** 
(0.147) 
1.429*** 
(0.127) 
 
Real effective exchange 
rate 
-0.041*** 
(0.011) 
-0.039*** 
(0.013) 
-0.050*** 
(0.015) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
-0.052*** 
(0.015) 
 
Working population 
growth 
-0.425 
(0.331) 
-0.776*** 
(0.299) 
-0.901*** 
(0.311) 
-0.658** 
(0.274) 
-0.792*** 
(0.290) 
 
Government 
consumption GDP ratio 
-0.670*** 
(0.148) 
-0.597*** 
(0.180) 
-0.535*** 
(0.165) 
-0.733*** 
(0.174) 
-0.666*** 
(0.154) 
 
Real retirement age 0.170 0.080 0.085 0.192 0.189 
 (0.148) (0.192) (0.189) (0.175) (0.173) 
Government 
effectiveness 
0.737 
(1.019) 
1.016 
(0.961) 
0.766 
(0.932) 
0.829 
(0.991) 
0.528 
(0.946) 
 
Crisis -1.595*** -1.771*** -2.142*** -1.415*** -1.740*** 
 (0.286) (0.320) (0.406) (0.315) (0.378) 
Employment protection 1.936* 
(1.069) 
-1.267 
(2.484) 
-0.784 
(2.509) 
1.101 
(1.066) 
1.608 
(1.138)  
Product market 
regulation 
  -0.775 
(0.590) 
 -0.647 
(0.455) 
      
First Stage      
Excluded instruments:      
Lagged employment 
protection 
0.877*** 
(0.085) 
0.7893*** 
(0.0864) 
0.7728*** 
(0.0872) 
0.8660*** 
(0.0908) 
0.8365*** 
(0.093) 
Government (left) 
composition 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.0004** 
(0.002) 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.0003  
(0.002) 
Partial R-squared of 
excluded instruments 
0.6065 0.5387 0.5217 0.5720 0.5432 
Weak Identification F test 0.0064 0.0068 0.0061 0.0064 0.0075 
Hansen J statistic 0.7150 0.8469 0.8589 0.6875 0.7408 
      
Observations 389 405 399 347 341 
R-squared 0.464 0.387 0.404 0.452 0.473 
Number of countries 23 28 28 23 23 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Advanced economy: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US 
Regression: fixed effect module 
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